



Introduction to Cryptography

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
January 2012

<http://www.garykessler.net/presentations>

Overview

- The role of cryptography
- Types of cryptographic algorithms
 - » Hash functions
 - » Secret key cryptography
 - » Public key cryptography
- Putting them altogether... case studies in cryptography
- Trust models
 - » Certificates
 - » Sample applications: SSL, personal certificates

The Role of Cryptography



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Cryptography

- The science of writing in secret codes
 - » Dates back to 1900 B.C. in Egypt (non-standard hieroglyphics); probably appears spontaneously soon after writing is developed
- Historically, two types of cryptography:
 - » Substitution
 - » Transposition/Permutation

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Substitution Ciphers

- Most famous: *Caesar's Cipher*
 - » Shift each letter to the right by 3
- Today: *Rotation 13 (ROT13)* still found on Unix systems and Usenet to hide offensive text, puzzle solutions, passwords, etc.

```
PLAIN: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
rot13: n o p q r s t u v w x y z a b c d e f g h i j k l m
```

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Transposition Cipher

Columnar transposition cipher

```
PLAINTEXT: CRYPTO TODAY IS A LOT MORE COMPLEX THAN IT USED TO BE
```

```
CRYPTOTODA
YISALOTMOR
ECOMPLEXTH
ANITUSEDTO
BENSIVEGFL
```

```
ciphertext:  cyea bric neys oinp amts tlpu iool svtt
              eeee mxdg dott farh olxy
```

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Cryptography Today

- Cryptography is necessary today in telecommunications when communicating over any untrusted medium
- Digital cryptography basically comes in three varieties:
 - » Hash functions (no key)
 - » Secret key cryptography (one key)
 - » Public key cryptography (two keys)

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Secure Communications


- Secure communications requires:
 - » Authentication
 - » Message integrity
 - » Non-repudiation
 - » Privacy/confidentiality

 - » Key exchange

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Hash Functions



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Hash Functions

plaintext $\xrightarrow{\text{hash function}}$ ciphertext

- No key
 - » Plaintext (and length of plaintext) is not recoverable from the ciphertext
 - » Examples: HMAC, MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, SHA
 - » Also called *message digests* or *one-way encryption*
- Primary use: Message integrity

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Hashing: UNIX Password File

```
carol:FM5ikbQt1K052:502:100:Carol Monaghan:/home/carol:/bin/bash
alex:IqAi7Mdyg/HcQ:503:100:Alex Insley:/home/alex:/bin/bash
gary:FkJXupRyFqY4s:501:100:Gary Kessler:/home/gary:/bin/bash
todd:edGqQUAaGv7g6:506:101:Todd Pritsky:/home/todd:/bin/bash
sarah:Jbw6BwE4XoUHo:504:101:Sarah Antone:/home/schedule:/bin/bash
josh:FiH0ONcjPutlg:505:101:Joshua Kessler:/home/webroot:/bin/bash
```

SHA and MD5 Hashing

The screenshot displays a Windows Command Prompt window and a 'Drive/Image Verify Results' dialog box. The Command Prompt shows the following commands and output:

```
C:\My Programs\forensics>copy con tyui_a.txt
a
Z
1 file(s) copied.
C:\My Programs\forensics>copy con tyui_b.txt
b
Z
1 file(s) copied.
C:\My Programs\forensics>sha_verify tyui_a.tx
File: tyui_a.txt
MD5 933222B19FF3E7EA5F65517EA1F7D57E
SHA 764C16AF46DD4F15EDB05ECC5595B50CBE3714EA
C:\My Programs\forensics>sha_verify tyui_b.txt
File: tyui_b.txt
MD5 C5053D4DA03789BFC4BEE760FADE936
SHA 854D675A26DC0254A07B5725BA71242555863EB5
C:\My Programs\forensics>
```

The 'Drive/Image Verify Results' dialog box shows the following information:


General	
Name	USB_Thumb_Drive.E01
Sector count	15600

MD5 Hash	
Computed hash	80ba5fdb4805808b5c399e50d10ef167
Stored verification hash	80ba5fdb4805808b5c399e50d10ef167
Report Hash	80ba5fdb4805808b5c399e50d10ef167
Verify result	Match

SHA1 Hash	
Computed hash	6962a9ee3a515fdb11f027a95ff6f5dfc6fd0a4
Report Hash	6962a9ee3a515fdb11f027a95ff6f5dfc6fd0a4
Verify result	Match

Keyed-Hash MAC (HMAC)

- RFC 2104
- Mutual authentication without sending key on the network



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Hash Collisions

- There are 2^K possible hash values (where K = hash length) while there are an infinite number of files
 - » Since $\infty \gg 2^K$, there *will* be hash collisions
 - In fact, an infinite number of files will have the same hash!
- The problem: *Can hash collisions be forced?*
 - » What is the impact on information security?
 - » What is the impact on digital forensics?
- Solutions to collisions
 - » Use longer hashes (e.g., SHA-256)
 - » Use multiple hashes (e.g., MD5 and SHA-1)

Ref: <http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.htm#hash>

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What About Hashed Passwords?



Your Results

Found: c87d19bfa5f5a0c8dc75379411af75a6 = md5("kumquat")

Your Results


Sorry! Guess we couldn't find it.

Using 2a9e402f3b2a4db8826606d527a27609, the MD5 hash of a disk drive.

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Secret Key Cryptography




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Secret Key Cryptography




- Single key (*symmetric cryptography*)
 - » Same key is used for encryption and decryption
 - » Examples: AES, DES, IDEA, 3DES, RC4, RC5, CAST, Blowfish, Twofish
- Primary use: Privacy



DES

- Designed to be fast in hardware, slow in software, resistant to various attacks
- Block cipher using 56-bit key and 64-bit blocks
- 56-bit key expanded to 64 bits using parity
- K_i is a 48-bit value derived from 64-bit key
- FIPS 46-2/ANS X3.92 describes entire process



A Few Words About DES...



- DES introduced in 1977
 - » Proposed by IBM with 56- or 128-bit key; NSA adopted 56-bit key
- March 1998, U.S. Gov't. still claims that DES is safe from attack...
 - » July 1998, EFF introduces DES cracker designed for \$220K; can break keys in average 4.5 days
 - » For \$1M, could break DES keys in average <22 hours
- We care because DES is the most widely used crypto scheme in the financial industry!!

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Breaking DES

- DES Challenge I (3/97)
 - » 84 days using thousands of computers
- DES Challenge II (1998)
 - » *distributed.net* (40 days)
 - » EFF Deep Crack (3 days)
- DES Challenge III (1/99)
 - » *distributed.net* and Deep Crack (<1 day)



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Interim DES Replacements

- Triple-DES (3DES)
 - » Uses two or three keys, and three crypto steps
 - $C = E_{K3}(D_{K2}(E_{K1}(P)))$ $P = D_{K1}(E_{K2}(D_{K3}(C)))$
 - » Effective key length is 112 or 168 bits against brute force attacks
 - If two keys, $K1=K3$
 - » Recommended for all new implementations
- DESX
 - » XOR 64 additional key bits to plaintext
 - » Effective key length is 120 bits against brute force attacks
 - » Design by Rivest to protect against brute-force attacks

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Advanced Encryption Standard

- NIST's next-generation SKC
 - » Open process
 - » International "competition"
 - Process started 1997, decision 2001
- Rijndael
 - » Employs 128-, 192-, or 256-bit key on a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit block
 - AES only uses a 128-bit block size
 - » Selection criteria included general security features, security implementation, software performance, smart card performance, hardware performance, and design features

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AES Characteristics

- AES is an iterated block cipher
 - » Uses a 128-bit block (**Nb** = 4 words [32-bits])
 - » AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 use a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit key (**Nk** = 4, 6, or 8 words), respectively
 - » AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 employ 10, 12, or 14 encryption rounds (**Nr**), respectively

s_{00}	s_{01}	s_{02}	s_{03}
s_{10}	s_{11}	s_{12}	s_{13}
s_{20}	s_{21}	s_{22}	s_{23}
s_{30}	s_{31}	s_{32}	s_{33}

128-bit block (*State*)

k_{00}	k_{01}	k_{02}	k_{03}	k_{04}	k_{05}
k_{10}	k_{11}	k_{12}	k_{13}	k_{14}	k_{15}
k_{20}	k_{21}	k_{22}	k_{23}	k_{24}	k_{25}
k_{30}	k_{31}	k_{32}	k_{33}	k_{34}	k_{35}

192-bit Cipher Key

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AES Cipher Keys

- AES uses a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit Cipher Key but needs a different key for every cipher round
- Key Expansion function creates enough *Round Keys*
 - » Each Round Key is the same length as the block (**Nb**)
 - » Length of Expanded Key = **Nb** * (**Nr** + 1)
 - » Cipher Key occupies first **Nk** words of Expanded Key and is the basis for deriving rest of key material
- Example using 192-bit Cipher Key (**Nb=4, Nk=6, Nr=12**)

Expanded Key:	w_0	w_1	w_2	w_3	w_4	w_5	w_6	w_7	w_8	w_9	w_{10}	w_{11}	...	w_{48}	w_{49}	w_{50}	w_{51}
Round Keys:	Round key 0				Round key 1				Round key 2				...	Round key 12			

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AES Algorithm

```
Cipher (byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)])
begin
  byte state[4,Nb]

  state = in

  AddRoundKey(state, w)

  for round = 1 step 1 to Nr-1
    SubBytes(state)
    ShiftRows(state)
    MixColumns(state)
    AddRoundKey(state, w+round*Nb)
  end for

  SubBytes(state)
  ShiftRows(state)
  AddRoundKey(state, w+Nr*Nb)

  out = state
end
```

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AES Basic Functions

- AES algorithm employs four basic transformations:
 - » *AddRoundKey*: XOR Round Key with State
 - » *SubBytes*: Substitute bytes in State s to form State s' on a byte-for-byte basis using S-box
 - » *ShiftRows*: Left circular shift of rows 1-3 in State s by 1, 2, and 3 bytes, respectively
 - » *MixColumns*: Apply mathematical transformation to each column in State s to form State s'

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
Key Length and SKC

Attacker	Budget	Tool	Time Per Recovered Key		Key Length For Protection In Late-1995
			40-bit	56-bit	
Pedestrian hacker	Tiny	PC	1 week	Never	45
			5 hours	38 years	50
Small business	\$10K	FPGA	12 min.	18 mon.	55
Corporate Dept.	\$300K	FPGA	24 sec.	19 days	60
		ASIC	0.18 sec.	3 hours	
Big Company	\$10M	FPGA	7 sec.	13 hours	70
		ASIC	5 ms	6 min.	
Government	\$300M	ASIC	0.2 ms	12 sec.	75

ASIC = Application-specific integrated circuit
 FPGA = Field programmable gate array

Source: Blaze, et al., 1996

Public Key Cryptography



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Public Key Cryptography



- Two keys (*asymmetric cryptography*)
 - » One key is used for encryption, the other for decryption
 - » The two keys are related mathematically but knowledge of one key does not easily yield knowledge of the other key
 - » Examples: RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC, ElGamal
- Primary uses: Authentication, non-repudiation, key exchange (but invented for bulk encryption)

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PKC

- All PKC based on some mathematical function that is easy but where the inverse is hard
 - » E.g., exponentiation vs. logarithms, multiplication vs. factorization
- Actual *invention* is unclear...
 - » NSA, 1966 (no proof)
 - » U.K. Gov't. Communication Headquarters, 1969 (classified until 1990s)
 - » Merkle's Puzzles (claim 1974, pub. 1978)
 - » Diffie & Hellman (pub. 1976)

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The Knapsack Algorithm

451 117

602 934

725 1350

138 1197 273 665 875

Knapsack weighs 3.064 kg.

Problem: The knapsack is filled with a subset of the items shown (with weights in grams). Given that the knapsack weighs 3064 grams, can you determine which set of items is contained in the knapsack?

This problem becomes computationally infeasible when there are 100 items. However, if the set of weights has nice properties known only to someone with special "trapdoor" information, then that person can quickly decipher the secret information; i.e., a 100-bit word that specifies which of the items are in the knapsack.


After "An Overview of Public Key Cryptography," M.E. Hellman, IEEE Communications Magazine, Nov. 1978

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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Alice and Bob agree on the value of a large prime number, N and a generator, G . Each calculates a private key (X) and public key (Y). The secret key (K) is derived from X and the other person's Y .



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RSA Mathematics

- Create private/public key pair:
 - » Choose 2 primes, p & q
 - » Modulus $n = pq$
 - » Select public exponent e , relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$
 - » Calculate private exponent $d = (ed-1)/[(p-1)(q-1)]$
- To encrypt message M with public key:
 - » $C = M^e \text{ mod } n$
- To decrypt ciphertext C with private key:
 - » $M = C^d \text{ mod } n$
- Of course, either key can be used first...

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RSA Example

- Select $p=3$, $q=5$
- $n = pq = 15$
- Choose $e=11$, relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1) = 8$
- $(11d-1)/8$ must be an integer; choose $d=3$
- $M = 8384$ (0x8384)
- Encrypt
 - » Public key value is $(e,n) = (11,15)$
 - » $C_i = M_i^{11} \text{ mod } 15$
 - » $C = 0x2c24$
- Decrypt
 - » Private key value is $(d,n) = (3,15)$
 - » $M_i = C_i^3 \text{ mod } 15$
 - » $M = 0x8384$

RSA Application



ciphertext = PVT_{ALICE} (message)

Alice can sign messages by encrypting with her own private key; this **authenticates** that she sent the message

ciphertext = PUB_{BOB} (message)

Alice can ensure that only Bob can read a message by encrypting with his public key; this provides **privacy** and proves that Bob was the intended receiver.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

- First described in 1985 by two independent teams
- Uses logarithms and hard-to-solve problems that fall on an elliptic curve
 - » Because problems are harder to solve than factoring, smaller keys yield better protection and faster processing than RSA
- Current uses: Smart cards, mobile devices, PDAs
 - » Primary vendor is Certicom

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The Elliptic Curve


The problem: Given two points, P and Q, on an elliptic curve, find integer $i \ni P=iQ$.

- Public key = iQ
- Private key = i

Elliptic curve consists of the set of real numbers (x,y) that satisfy:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

Small changes in a and b can make major changes in the shape of the curve and, therefore, the set of (x,y) points that satisfy the equation.



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Public Key Sizes Compared

ECC Key Size	RSA Key Size	Key Size Ratio	AES Key Size
163	1,024	1:6	--
256	3,072	1:12	128
384	7,680	1:20	192
512	15,360	1:30	256


All key sizes are in bits

Source: Certicom, NIST

Signing and Key Exchange

- PKC is used for authentication and key exchange
 - » But not all PKC algorithms do both
- Common PKC schemes
 - » Authentication: RSA, Digital Signature Standard
 - » Key exchange: RSA, Diffie-Hellman
- PKC keys tend to be very long (e.g., 2,048 to 4,096 bits) because they have relatively long lifetimes


Sample Cryptosystems



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Sample Hybrid Cryptosystem



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Case Study: PGP Signatures

```
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi Carol.

What was that pithy Groucho Marx quote?

/kess

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
Charset: noconv

iQA/AwUBNFUD05Wocz5SFtuEEQJx/ACaAgR97+vvDU6XWELV/GANjAAgBtUANjG3
Sdfw2JgmZiOLNjFe7jP0Y8/M
=jUAU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```

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Case Study: PGP Encryption

```
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
MessageID: DAdVB3wzpBr3YRunZwYvhK5gBKXBOb/m
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=MpRf
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
```

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
Case Study: Windows 2000/XP EFS

- Encrypting File System (EFS)
 - » When the file is saved to disk:
 - Random file encryption key (FEK) is created
 - File contents encrypted using FEK and encryption algorithm
 - Windows 2000 and XP default to DESX; XP also supports 3DES
 - Windows XP SP1, Server 2003, Vista, and Server 2008 default to AES; also support DESX and 3DES
 - Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 default to AES, SHA, and ECC; also support DESX and 3DES
 - FEK stored with file, encrypted with user's RSA public key (and, optionally, recovery agent's RSA public key)
 - » When the file is opened:
 - FEK recovered for decryption using RSA private key, which can be stored on external floppy disk or smart card
 - If private key lost, files may be accessed using RA's private key
 - Key tied to username prior to Win XP SP2; now uses user password
 - » A pre-encryption backup file is *deleted* after encryption

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EFS



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The cipher command (Windows)

```
C:\> cipher /u /n
Encrypted File(s) on your system:

C:\My Documents\document_s\SCR09.GIF
C:\My Documents\document_s\SCR10.GIF
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\1_real1.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\2_real2.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\3_bogus1.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\4_bogus2.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\5_has_data.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\62.193.219.166.html.txt
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\6_after_submit.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\7_tcp_stream.png
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\commnatlbank.acp
C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\Re Help with investigation.txt

C:\>
```

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

Whole Disk Encryption (WDE)

- WDE encrypts entire drive
 - » WDE modifies boot sector 0 to go to alternate loader
 - » Files are available to user after a password is entered when logging on
 - Files are encrypted when viewed by forensics software if disk drive is powered down
- Some disk encryption software
 - » Windows Vista
 - Full volume encryption; Vista encrypts data partition, but not boot partition
 - » PGP 9.0
 - » Pointsec
 - » Safeboot
 - » Utimaco
- A case for live forensics...

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Pre-Boot Logon



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<http://toorcon.techpathways.com/uploads/zeroview.zip>

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Sector 0 Strings

- PGP 9
 - » "PGPGUARD" at offset 0x3
 - » "bootguard" at offset 0x16C
- SafeBoot 4.13
 - » "SafeBoot" at offsets 0x3, 0x168, 0x183

Windows Vista

- Vista encryption will cause forensics examiners some problems...
 - » Hardware-enabled full-volume encryption
 - » Windows Vista Enterprise and Ultimate
 - Encryption **not** on by default
 - » Use BitLocker drive encryption tied to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip or USB flash drive for key storage


Other Crypto Schemes

- TrueCrypt
 - » Open source encryption for Windows, MacOS, or Linux
 - » Virtual encrypted disk using AES, Serpent, or Twofish
 - » Can create hidden encrypted volume
 - » First released in 2004
- FileVault
 - » File encryption for Macs, using AES
 - » Password derived from user's login password



Slot	Volume	Size	Mount Directory	Type
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7	/Volumes/JAMESTC/James	1.5 GB	/Volumes/JIMMY	Normal
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				

Plausible Deniability



The screenshot shows a Mac OS X desktop environment. A terminal window is open, displaying the output of several commands. The first command is `bp1ist00 Zpassphrase|disgracedface -file://localhost/Users/.Face/Face.sparsebundle %? p7XP`, which lists system users and their details. The second command is `Sean-Cavanaugh-MacBook-Pro:desktop Face$ cat After\ Secure\ VM.txt | grep -n -C 3 disgracedface`, which shows the contents of a file named `After\ Secure\ VM.txt`. The output of this command is displayed in a blue box with the text `Contents of /var/vm/sleepimage`. The desktop background is a purple and blue abstract image, and the dock at the bottom contains various application icons.

EDD

- JADsoftware's Encrypted Disk Detector
 - » Tests for BitLocker, PGP, and TrueCrypt encrypted drives and volumes (partitions)
 - » http://www.jadsoftware.com/go/?page_id=167

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EDD D:\EDD.exe

```
Encrypted Disk Detector v1.0
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty,
all risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: NTFS
PhysicalDrive1, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: NTFS
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

No TrueCrypt, PGP, or Bitlocker encrypted volumes detectable by EDD were found.
Press any key to continue...
(Use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)
```

Two physical drives, both with NTFS; no encrypted volume.

EDD D:\EDD.exe

```
Encrypted Disk Detector v1.0
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty,
all risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: NTFS
PhysicalDrive1, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: r06
PhysicalDrive1, Partition 1 might be an encrypted volume,
or contains a damaged boot sector.
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

Press any key to continue...
(Use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)
```

Two physical drives. The first volume uses NTFS and is not encrypted. The second volume is detected as possibly encrypted (in fact, it is a TrueCrypt volume).

Screen shots from <http://www.jadsoftware.com/home/edd.htm>

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EDD D:\EDD.exe

```

Encrypted Disk Detector v1.0
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty,
// all risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive1 contains a TrueCrypt encrypted volume.
PhysicalDrive1, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: r06
|| |
|| |
PhysicalDrive1, Partition 1 might be an encrypted volume,
or contains a damaged boot sector.
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

Press any key to continue...
(use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)

```

Two physical drives. The first volume is encrypted with TrueCrypt. The second volume is detected as *possibly* encrypted (in fact, it is also a TrueCrypt volume).

EDD D:\EDD.exe

```

Encrypted Disk Detector v1.0
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty,
// all risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive0 contains a PGP encrypted volume.
PhysicalDrive1 contains a PGP encrypted volume.
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

Press any key to continue...
(use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)

```

Two physical drives, both encrypted with PGP.

Screen shots from <http://www.jadsoftware.com/home/edd.htm> © 1998-2012, Gary C. Kessler 58

EDD D:\EDD.exe

```

Encrypted Disk Detector v1.0
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty,
// all risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: -PUE-PS-
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 is a BitLocker encrypted volume.
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 2 --- OEM ID: NTFS
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

Press any key to continue...
(use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)

```

One physical drive. The first partition is encrypted with BitLocker. The second partition is unencrypted and is the BitLocker boot partition.

EDD D:\EDD.exe

```

Encrypted Disk Detector v1.1
Copyright (c) 2009 Jad Saliba
http://www.jadsoftware.com
// This program comes with no guarantee or warranty.
// All risk is assumed by the user. //

* Checking physical drives on system... *
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 --- OEM ID: Dell 8.0
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 1 --- Volume label: DellUtility
PhysicalDrive0, Partition 2 --- OEM ID: NTFS
* Completed checking physical drives on system. *

* Now checking logical volumes on system... *
Drive C: is located on PhysicalDrive0, Partition #2.
Drive D: is a CD-ROM/DVD device (#0).
Drive G: appears to be a virtual disk
- possibly a TrueCrypt or PGP encrypted volume
* Completed checking logical volumes on system. *

Press any key to continue...
(use 'DiskID /batch' to bypass this prompt next time)

```

One physical drive. The first partition contains Dell utilities; the second partition (C:) uses NTFS and is not encrypted. The D: drive appears to be a CD/DVD drive. G: is reported as a possible virtual drive with an encrypted partition (in fact, it is a TrueCrypt encrypted volume).

Screen shots from <http://www.jadsoftware.com/home/edd.htm> © 1998-2012, Gary C. Kessler 59

Secure Communication Protocols

- Secure MIME (S/MIME)
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
 - » https, ftps, pops, smtps, ...
- Secure Electronic Transactions (SET)
- Secure HTTP (S-HTTP)
- Transaction Internet Protocol (TIP)
- Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
- IP Security Protocol (IPsec)
- Kerberos
- Server Gated Cryptography (SGC)
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- Secure Shell (SSH)
- Authenticated POP (APOP)

Do *not* trust “secret” cryptographic protocols (e.g., Skipjack!). The safety is in the choice (and length) of the *key*, not the secrecy of the *algorithm* (Kerckhoffs' Principle, 1883).

NSA Suite B Cryptography

- NSA guideline to protect government documents at SECRET level (2005)
- Expected lifetime: 2031+

Cryptographic Function	Sensitive But Unclassified	Classified
Secret Key Algorithm	AES-128	AES-256
Hash Algorithm	SHA-256	SHA-384
Public Key Algorithm	ECC w/ Diffie-Hellman (key exchange) and ECC w/ DSA (digital signatures); 256 and 384 bits	

Trust in Cryptosystems



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Trust Models

- When using cryptography, how can you trust the entity that gives you a key?
 - » PGP Web of trust
 - » Kerberos trusted server and SKC for *a priori* relationships
 - » PKI trusted third parties and PKC for anyone-to-anyone communication

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
PGP Web of Trust

Keys	Validity	Trust	Size	Description
Gary C. Kessler <kumquat@sover.net>	●	████████	2048/1024	DH/DSS key pair
George Bakos <alpinista@bigfoot.com>	●	████████	3072/1024	DH/DSS public key
George Bakos <alpinista@bigfoot.com>	●	████████	768	RSA public key
Michael Schirling <mschirli@dps.state.vt.us>	●	████████	2048/1024	DH/DSS public key
Mich Kabay <mkabay@compuserve.com>	●	████████	768	RSA public key
Mich Kabay <mkabay@compuserve.com>	●	████████		User ID
Mich Kabay <mkabay@compuserve.c...>	●	████████		RSA exportable signature
Robert G. Moskowitz <rgm@icsa.net>	●	████████		RSA trusted introducer signature
Gary C. Kessler <kumquat@sover.net>	●	████████		DSS exportable signature
Microsoft Security Response Center <secure@...>	●	████████	2048	RSA public key
N. Todd Pritsky <todd@hill.com>	●	████████	2048/1024	DH/DSS public key
N. Todd Pritsky <todd@hill.com>	●	████████		User ID
N. Todd Pritsky <todd@hill.com>	●	████████		DSS exportable signature
Gary C. Kessler <kumquat@sover.net>	●	████████		DSS exportable signature
PGP Support Key DSS <pgpsupport@pgp.com>	●	████████	1024/1024	DH/DSS public key
Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Corporate Key	●	████████	2048/1024	DH/DSS public key
Robert G. Moskowitz <rgm@icsa.net>	●	████████	1024	RSA public key
The SANS Institute <sans@sans.org>	●	████████	1024/1024	DH/DSS public key
The SANS Institute <sans@sans.org>	●	████████		User ID
The SANS Institute <sans@sans.org>	●	████████		DSS exportable signature
Unknown Signer, Key ID is 0a7C6E575F	●	████████		DSS exportable signature

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Kerberos



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Public Key Infrastructure

- How can a party's public key be found if not known locally? Where is the key stored?
- How does a recipient verify that a public key really belongs to the sender *and* that it is being used for a legitimate purpose?
- When does a public key expire?
- How can a key be revoked in case of loss or compromise?

Certificates


- *Certificates* bind a public key to an individual, position, or other entity, and provide
 - » Identification
 - » Expiration date
 - » Issuing authority
 - » Serial number
 - » Policies about how the user was identified
 - » Limitations on how the key may be used




Certificates in Real-Life...

- Certificates identify us, what we are allowed to do, issuer, validity period, etc.
 - » Driver's license: Name, DOB, address, type of vehicle, issuing state, valid period, serial number, photo(?), organ donation(?)
 - » Credit card: Name, serial number, valid period, issuer
 - » SCUBA certification: Name, DOB, serial number, level of training, certification date, instructor, issuing agency, photo(?)

ITU-T X.509 Digital Certificate



Sample Browser Certificate



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
Secure Sockets Layer

- Originally developed by Netscape Communications
 - » SSL v2.0 (**deprecated**) and v3.0 (**weak**)
 - » Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.0 ~ "SSL v3.1" (RFC 2246)
 - **Theoretical vulnerability described in 2002 made practical in 2011!**
 - TLS v1.1 (RFC 4346) and TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246)
- Provides privacy, integrity, client/server authentication
- Application-independent
 - » Can be used with HTTP, Telnet, FTP, NNTP, IMAP, POP3 over TCP
 - » Datagram TLS (v1.2, RFC 6347) operates over UDP
- Two main protocols
 - » SSL Handshake Protocol (parameter negotiation)
 - » SSL Record Protocol (data transfer)

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
HTTP Over SSL



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SSL Handshake Protocol



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Limitations of PKI

- A digital signature does **not** prove that Alice signed a message, but that her private key did
 - » Good cryptographic algorithms can be bypassed by viruses, malicious code, abuse/misuse by users, and other real-world events
- Users do not generally check the source or validity of received certificates

Summary and Closure!



Detecting Encryption

- Cryptography provides *secret* communication but not necessarily *hidden*
 - » Use of crypto does not form a covert communications channel
 - » Encrypted messages and files can be detected by a third party

Example Detection Statistics (FTK)

- Most encryption detection schemes are testing for randomness; high randomness suggests use of encryption
 - » *Arithmetic Mean*: Calculated by summing all of the bytes in a file and dividing by the file length; if random, the value should be ~1.75.
 - » *Chi-Squared Error Percent*: This distribution is calculated for a byte stream in a file; the value indicates how frequently a truly random number would exceed the calculated value.
 - » *Entropy*: Describes the information density (per Shannon) of a file in bits/character; as entropy $\rightarrow 8$, there is more randomness.
 - » *MCPI Error Percent*: The Monte Carlo algorithm uses statistical techniques to approximate the value of π ; A high error rate implies more randomness.
 - » *Serial Correlation Coefficient*: Indicates the amount to which each byte is an e-mail relies on the previous byte. A value close to 0 indicates randomness.


Crypto Attack Methods

- Password guessing
- Known plaintext
- Chosen plaintext
- Known ciphertext
- Dictionary attack
- Brute force attack
- Side channel attacks

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Crypto Breaking Tools

- Rainbow tables
- *distributed.net* 
- Rack attack
- Passware
- ElcomSoft
 - » Password Recovery Bundle
- AccessData
 - » Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK)
 - » Distributed Network Attack (DNA)
 - » Portable Office Rainbow Table (PORT)

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Some Parting Notes


- Authentication and proof of identity \neq trust
- Goodness of a crypto scheme is *time in use*, not *secrecy of the algorithm*
 - » Kerckhoffs' Principle, 1883
- Good crypto can be implemented poorly
 - » Think WEP, CSS
- Theoretical ways to break a crypto scheme may not be practical
 - » E.g., almost every crypto scheme can be brute-forced...

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A Caveat About Cryptography


- Crypto is *necessary* but not *sufficient* for trusted, secure communication
 - » Crypto can provide perfect security... but humans provide an insurmountable weak link!
 - » Crypto can be used to prove that I am who I say I am but it can't tell you whether to trust me or not
- Ref: *Secrets and Lies*, B. Schneier



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A Little Crypto Humor...



Foxtrot, 4/16/2003

<http://xkcd.com/538/>,
Feb. 2009



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Additional References

- *Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications*, Ferguson, Schneier, & Kohno
- *The Code Book: The Evolution of Secrecy from Mary Queen of Scots to Quantum Cryptography*, Singh
- *Classical and Contemporary Cryptology*, Spillman
- *Malicious Cryptography*, Young & Yung

- Counterpane (www.counterpane.com)
- Cryptography Research (www.cryptography.com)
- RSA's Crypto FAQ (www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2152)
- GCK's crypto overview paper (www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html) and crypto links (www.garykessler.net/library/securityurl.html#crypto)

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<http://infoassurance.norwich.edu/>



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

3DES	Triple DES	ISP	Internet service provider
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard (NIST)	ITU-T	International Telecommunication Union, Telecommunication Standardization Sector
ANS	American National Standard	IV	Initial vector
CA	Certificate authority	MAC	Message authentication code
CPS	Certification practice statement	MD2/4/5	Message Digest 2, 4, & 5
CRL	Certificate Revocation List	MIPS	Millions of instructions per second
DES	Data Encryption Standard	MS	Microsoft
DOB	Date of birth	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
DoS	Denial of service	NNTP	Network News Transport Protocol (IETF)
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST)	NSA	National Security Agency
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography	OS	Operating system
EFF	Electronic Frontier Foundation	PDA	Personal digital assistant
EFS	Encrypting File System (W2K)	PGP	Pretty Good Privacy
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard	PKC	Public key cryptography
FTP	File Transfer Protocol (IETF)	PKI	Public key infrastructure
HMAC	Hashed message authentication code	POP	Post Office Protocol (IETF)
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol (IETF)	RA	Registration Authority
https	HTTP over SSL	RC2/4/5	Rivest Cipher (or Ron's Code) 2, 4, and 5
IDEA	International Data Encryption Algorithm	RFC	Request for Comments (IETF)
IE	Internet Explorer (MS)	RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force		
IMAP	Internet Message Access Protocol (IETF)		

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
Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

SCUBA	Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm (NIST)
SKC	Secret-key cryptography
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer (Netscape)
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol (IETF)
TLS	Transport Layer Security (IETF)
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
WDE	Whole disk encryption
W2K	Windows 2000 (MS)
XOR	Exclusive OR

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Questions? Comments? Queries?



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